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ABSTRACT
Implementing Dynamic Coarse & Fine Grained Taint Analysis for Rhino
JavaScript
by Tejas Saoji
Web application systems today are at great risk from attackers. They use
methods like cross-site scripting, SQL injection, and format string attacks to exploit
vulnerabilities in an application. Standard techniques like static analysis, code audits
seem to be inadequate in successfully combating attacks like these. Both the techniques
point out the vulnerabilities before an application is run. However, static analysis
may result in a higher rate of false positives, and code audits are time-consuming and
costly. Hence, there is a need for reliable detection mechanisms.
Dynamic taint analysis offers an alternate solution — it marks the incoming data
from the untrusted source as ‘tainted.’’ The flow of tainted data is tracked during
the program execution. Whenever tainted data is used in a security-sensitive context,
a proper action is taken. The execution may also be suspended depending upon the
severity of the operation.
This project implements dynamic taint analysis in Rhino JavaScript. The focus is
on adding support for coarse-grained and fine-grained string tainting. Coarse-grained
tainting works at the granularity level of a string while fine-grained tainting works at
the granularity level of a character in a string. Both approaches are discussed in further
detail in the paper. I have also written a SQL library to leverage my implementation
of taint analysis in Rhino and conducted performance tests to contrast the overhead
of coarse & fine grained taint analysis. My test results show that fine-grained taint
analysis in general incurs more overhead than coarse-grained taint analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
The Basics
Web application systems today are at great risk from attackers. They use
techniques like SQL injection, format string attacks, and cross-site scripting to exploit
vulnerabilities in web applications [1]. Attacks like these are caused due to ‘‘bad’’
user input. Attacks on web applications caused due to unchecked user input are
recognized as being the most common. The above mentioned attacks are a form of
code injection. SQL injection is where a user inputs bad SQL statements into the
data sent to an application that results in unintended actions being performed on
the database. Cross-site scripting occurs when a dynamically generated web page
shows user input that has not been properly validated. Format string attacks occur
when user input is treated as a command by an application. When unchecked user
input is provided as a format string to the printf function in C, the attacker can
control the behavior of printf by inserting format directives [2]. The eval is another
such example. The eval is a dynamic feature provided by JavaScript that contain a
code string that is executed dynamically. When user entered data is passed to eval, it
enables the attacker to have his desired code executed when the program is executed.
It is very crucial to prevent the above mentioned attacks. However, it is difficult
to do so by imposing standard access control policies [2]. For example, in the case
of an SQL injection, a policy is enforced that does not allow special characters (for
e.g. semicolon, single-quote) and/or SQL keywords/commands (for e.g. UPDATE,
DELETE, DROP, WHERE) in the user input. Though enforcing such a policy may
prevent a possible SQL injection attack, it may sometimes clash with valid user inputs.
It does in this specific case when the user input is ‘‘O’Reilly.’’ An entry like this
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would be considered as invalid, and hence a perfectly valid query would be rejected.
Such a policy makes the use of database very difficult, and may result in failure of
the web application [2].
Other methods like static analysis and code audits also turn out to be not very
fruitful in successfully combating the attacks mentioned above. One advantage that
static analysis provides is that it finds all the vulnerabilities before the application is
run. It avoids runtime taint tracking and hence is more efficient that dynamic analysis.
However, it lacks precision. Static analysis may produce a warning whenever untrusted
data is used in a security-critical operation, even if there is no attack. This problem
can be addressed by the use of the concept of endorsement. The developer needs to put
validation checks on the untrusted data to ensure that it is safe, and then ‘‘endorse’’
it to indicate that that data can be safely used in a security-sensitive operation. The
difficult task is to identify all the places in the code that require validation checks [2].
This requires detailed code audits. Code audits are very time consuming and costly
affairs. As most developers do not possess expertise in performing security audits,
they are often outsourced to security consultants, which adds to the cost [3]. The
notion of validity is determined by the source of the input and the manner the input is
used in the program. Hence, one needs to go back and forth to determine appropriate
validation checks to be put at appropriate places in the code. Moreover, it is hard
for the programmers to code validation checks correctly, and the checks themselves
frequently have been the source of vulnerabilities [2]. Hence, this altogether is a very
error prone process.
Hence, to address such vulnerabilities, the paper suggests implementing taint
analysis. Taint analysis is a form of information flow analysis [1]. The incoming data
from outside the code is not trustworthy. Hence, taint analysis marks the data coming
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from untrusted sources as tainted. It also tracks the flow of taint in the program.
Taint information flows from one variable to another. When tainted data affects
untainted data, the previously untainted data is also marked as tainted. This is how
taint propagates in a program. When tainted data is used in security-critical functions,
an error is thrown. As an example, a tainted string used in a print statement. Taint
analysis helps in detection and prevention of the aforementioned vulnerabilities in
web application systems.
Two ways to implement taint analysis are:
1. Static analysis
2. Dynamic monitors
Static analysis provides one advantage over dynamic analysis; it finds all the
potential vulnerabilities before program is executed. However, in comparison to
dynamic analysis, static analysis lacks accuracy. The incoming data is tainted while
the program is in execution in dynamic taint analysis. The tainted data is tracked
throughout the program execution. Whenever tainted data is used in a security-
sensitive context, a proper action is taken. The execution may also be suspended
depending upon the severity of the operation.
This project implements dynamic taint analysis in JavaScript. JavaScript is one
of the most popular languages for client-side as well as server-side web applications.
It was recently reported that 98 websites out of the 100 most favored websites use
JavaScript [4]. JavaScript is also used by many tablets and smartphones to provide
platform independent features. The flexibility and dynamism that the language
provides makes it vulnerable to attacks like the ones mentioned above. Given the
popularity of the language, it is critical to address these vulnerabilities [4].
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Dynamic taint analysis tracks taint propagation when the program is in execution.
Two main approaches to dynamic taint analysis are [5] :
1. Coarse-grained taint analysis
2. Fine-grained/Precise-grained taint analysis
Coarse-grained taint analysis tracks taint information at the granularity level of
a string. It marks an untrusted string coming in from an outside source as tainted.
The taint propagates through the program execution at the string level. Hence, in
Figure 1 concatenation of an untainted string in variable x and a tainted string in
variable y results in the resultant string ‘‘Hello O’Reilly’’ in variable z to be marked
as tainted.
var x = "He l lo " ; // unta inted s t r i n g
var y = ta i n t ( "O’ Re i l l y " ) ; // ta in t ed s t r i n g
var z = x + y ; // ta in t ed s t r i n g
Figure 1: String tainting
The limitation with coarse-grained taint analysis is that, since it tracks taint at
the string level, it marks an entire string tainted even if it derives only a part from an
untrusted string. Hence, it is hard to sanitize a tainted string, untaint it, and use it
in a security-sensitive operation. This results in frequent false positives [5].
Languages like Perl and Ruby also provide taint support to prevent the systems
from attacks that are caused due to invalid input. Ruby has functions like taint to
explicitly mark the object as tainted, tainted? to check whether an object is tainted,
and untaint to remove the tainted mark from the object [6]. In Perl, one can use the
-T command line flag to explicitly enable the taint mode. In taint mode, Perl keeps a
check on every variable to see if it is tainted. Perl taints every data that comes from
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outside the code (for e.g., environment variables, command line arguments, all file
input, etc.), and does not allow such data to be used in an eval, passed through a shell,
or used in any of the Perl commands that modify files, directories, or processes [7].
One can use the tainted or istainted functions to determine whether a variable
contains tainted data. By using the tainted values as keys in a hash the values may
be untainted. The other way to do it is by using regular expressions. One can refer
to the subpatterns by matching tainted data to the regular expressions. The regular
expression match checks that the tainted data has only ‘‘good’’ characters, and no
‘‘bad’’ characters. Its the developers job to know what is ‘‘safe,’’ and design the regular
expressions accordingly.
Both Ruby & Perl implement tainting at coarser granularity. Perl is conservative
while determining if the data is tainted or not. It follows the principle of ‘‘one tainted
value taints the whole expression’’ [7]. Consider a subexpression of an expression that
contains tainted data. The subexpression is also marked as tainted, even if its value
itself does not contain any part of the tainted data.
Fine-grained taint analysis helps overcome the limitations posed by coarse-grained
taint analysis. Fine-grained taint analysis tracks taint information at the granularity
level of a character in a string. In Figure 2, concatenation of an untainted string
in variable x and a tainted string in variable y results in the resultant string ‘‘Hello
O’Reilly’’ with tainted characters indexed from 6 to 13 in variable z to be marked as
tainted.
var x = "He l lo " ; // unta inted s t r i n g
var y = ta i n t ( "O’ Re i l l y " ) ; // ta in t ed s t r i n g
var z = x + y ; // s t r i n g has ta in t ed cha ra c t e r s
Figure 2: String tainting
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Performance tests were conducted against an unmodified version of Rhino, and
my own two implementations of Rhino — Rhino coarse-grained and Rhino fine-grained.
SunSpider benchmark test suite was considered for this experiment. The performance
tests were conducted to contrast the overhead of coarse-grained & fine-grained taint
analysis. My test results show that fine-grained taint analysis in general incurs more
overhead than coarse-grained taint analysis.
Organization of the paper is as follows — The next chapter focuses on common
vulnerabilities in web application systems, traditional techniques to prevent these
attacks, and their limitations, and taint analysis. Chapters 3 talks about the
implementation in detail, and provides an insight into how dynamic taint analysis
helps us prevent these attacks by giving some nice examples. Chapter 4 presents the
performance test results. Chapter 5 concludes the paper and also discusses the scope
of future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we discuss two common vulnerabilities in web application
systems — SQL injection and cross-site scripting. We also discuss a few conventional
techniques to counter these attacks and some of their limitations. Finally we explore
how taint analysis can be deployed to overcome those limitations to help successfully
combat these attacks. Through this survey, we will try to find answers to the questions:
What is taint analysis? and Why taint analysis? The articles that are chosen in this
survey focus on both fundamental research and new developments in the application
of taint analysis in order to prevent these attacks on web applications.
2.1 Web Application Vulnerabilities
In this section, we talk about two attacks that are frequent in web application
systems in detail.
2.1.1 SQL Injection
SQL injection is one of the most common vulnerabilities in web application
systems. It is a form of code injection technique that is used to attack applications
driven by user data. A user enters ‘‘Bad’’ SQL statements into a textfield on a web
form for execution (e.g. to drop a table from the database, to update an entry in
the table etc.) [2] [3] [8]. Figure 3 shows a SQL query. The query in the variable
queryString derives a part of its value from the variable name, which contains
untrusted or a ‘‘tainted’’ string accepted from a user as input.
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queryStr ing=" s e l e c t * from employee where fname =‘"+name+" ’ " ;
Figure 3: Query string
An authorized user will enter a valid string. An attacker might enter something like:
‘‘Jane’ ; DROP TABLE employee; -- ’’;
With this value in the variable name, the query string in queryString looks like:
select * from employee where fname = ‘Jane’; DROP TABLE employee; --’
The semicolon is used to end the first query. The query string constructed in
the variable queryString consists of two queries. The first query retrieves all the
details of a person named Jane from the employee table, and the second query drops
the employee table from the database. Even though, the attacker does not have
permissions to drop the table from the database, he is able to do so by inserting bad
SQL statement in an entry field.
Imposing a policy that forbids the query string or a part of it to have tainted special
characters (for e.g. semicolon and single-quote) and/or SQL keywords/commands (for
e.g. UPDATE, DROP, WHERE, DELETE) will help prevent the attack [2].
2.1.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Cross-site scripting attack is caused when dynamically generated web pages
display user input on the browser before it is rightly checked and validated [3]. An
attacker may insert JavaScript code designed to so something bad into dynamically
generated content on a web page . When a user views such a page, the malicious code
gets executed on his/her machine. This script may steal the user’s account credentials
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or cookie information stored on his machine, and dump it to the attacker. Xu et al. [2]
gives a good example of a cross-site scripting attack. In this example, the web page
contains a form that submits a query to the web site. The query looks like this:
http://www.xyzbank.com/findATM?zip=95126
If a wrong zip code is entered, the website displays an error message like:
<HTML> ZIP code not found: 95126 </HTML>
In the above response, the user entered zip code is displayed back on the browser.
A sophisticated cross-site scripting attack may be constructed by an attacker who
misuses this. The attacker may send an email that contains a link to an unaware
user. The link could be like — click ‘‘here’’ to claim a reward. He implants a nasty
JavaScript code in the link. When the user clicks on the link ‘‘here,’’ a request is
sent to the bank with the nasty script as the zip code. The bank returns the same
response as above, this time embedding the nasty script in its response. This nasty
code is then downloaded and executed on the user’s machine. Since the response was
sent from a trusted website (i.e. the bank’s website), the code has access to all the
private information on the user machine.
2.2 Conventional techniques & their limitations
Conventional techniques like static analysis, code reviews, and access control
policies are popular to detect vulnerabilities caused because of invalid user input, like
the ones discussed above.
The main advantage of static analysis is that it finds the vulnerabilities statically,
and hence is more efficient than dynamic analysis. However, it lacks precision. Static
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analysis may produce a warning whenever untrusted data is used in a security-sensitive
operation. This problem can be addressed by the use of the concept of endorsement.
Endorsement is indicating that a particular dependency is ‘‘safe’’ to use. The developer
needs to put validation checks on the untrusted data to ensure that it is ‘‘safe, ’’ and
then endorse it to indicate that it can be used safely. The difficult task is to identify
all the places in the code that require validation checks [2]. This requires detailed code
reviews. Code reviews are very time consuming and costly affairs. They are often
outsourced to security consultants as most developers do not possess the expertise
in performing security audits, which adds to the cost. Also, new security errors are
often introduced as the old ones are corrected. Hence, this may require a second code
review [3]. The source of the input and the manner the input is used in determine the
notion of validity. Hence, one needs to go back and forth to determine appropriate
validation checks to be put at appropriate places in the code. Moreover, it’s hard for
programmers to code validation checks appropriately, and they themselves frequently
have been identified as the source of vulnerabilities [2]. Hence, this makes the entire
process prone to a lot of errors.
Enforcing traditional access control policies also does not provide an effective
solution to prevent these attacks [2]. For example, in the case of an SQL injection, a
policy is enforced that does not allow special characters (for e.g. semicolon, single-
quote) and/or SQL keywords/commands (for e.g. UPDATE, DELETE, DROP,
WHERE) in the user input. Though enforcing such a policy may prevent a possible
SQL injection attack, it may sometimes clash with valid user inputs. It does in this
specific case when the user input is ‘‘O’Reilly.’’ An entry like this would be considered
as invalid, and hence a perfectly valid query would be rejected. Such a policy makes
the use of database very difficult, and may result in failure of the web application [2].
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2.3 Taint Analysis Approaches
Taint analysis is a form of information flow analysis. Information flow analysis
ensures integrity of sensitive data by ensuring that information from tainted variables
do not flow into untainted variables [9]. Taint analysis tracks the flow of taint
information from one variable to another.
Two main approaches to taint analysis are — static approach and dynamic
approach, both of which have their own advantages and disadvantages. Figure 4
shows the different approaches to taint analysis. This section discusses each approach
in detail.
Figure 4: Taint analysis approaches
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2.3.1 Static Taint Analysis
Static taint analysis techniques are widely used to detect common vulnerabilities
in web application systems like SQL injection attacks, format string bugs, and input
validation errors. Static analysis detects dependencies instead of vulnerabilities [2].
In the case of an SQL injection attack, when a query uses unchecked untrusted data
in any manner, static analysis may give a warning. This may cause a problem if a
dependency like that is an essential part of the system. This problem can be addressed
by the use of the concept of endorsement [2]. The developer codes some validation
checks that are run on that untrusted piece of data to make sure it does not contain
any bad input. If it does, the data is ‘‘sanitized,’’ and then ‘‘endorsed’’ to suggest
that the data is now safe to be used in sensitive operations.
In W. Chang et al. [10], the system performs static analysis on the program to
recognize any violations of the security policies in place. If it finds violations of the
security policies, an analysis is performed to identify all the positions in the code that
demand dynamic analysis. The code is modified accordingly to enforce those policies
dynamically by performing dynamic analysis. Thus, the amount of dynamic tracking
needed is minimized by doing static analysis first.
One advantage of static analysis over dynamic analysis is that it finds all the
potential vulnerabilities before the program is executed [3]. However, in comparison
to dynamic analysis it lacks precision. Also, the programmer needs to understand
what is safe before ‘‘sanitizing’’ the untrusted data, and then ‘‘endorse’’ it. However,
there is no straightforward way to do this. The source of the input and the manner
in which the input is used later in the program determine if the input is ‘‘safe’’ or
not. Developers have to trace forward in the program to identify all the possible uses
of the untrusted input in security-critical operations, which is a very tedious task.
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Validation checks need to be performed at the point where the untrusted data is used
and at the source, which requires tracing back from security sensitive operations to
determine how its inputs were constructed. This requires manual examination of
a large number of programming paths, which can be very difficult and a laborious
task. [2].
2.3.2 Dynamic Taint Analysis
Newsome and Song [5] have implemented TaintCheck, a mechanism to detect
format string vulnerabilities and buffer overruns by performing dynamic taint analysis.
Dynamic taint analysis labels the data coming from the untrusted outside sources
as tainted. The program is observed throughout its execution to track the flow of
the tainted data. This help to keep a check on what new data becomes tainted. The
usage of tainted data in security-critical operations is also tracked [11], as this may
lead to an exploitation of security vulnerabilities. For example, when tainted data is
used as a jump address or a format string, it may lead to attacks like buffer overrun
or format string vulnerability.
The dynamic taint analysis can be performed in two ways:
1. Coarse-grained taint analysis
2. Fine-grained taint analysis
2.3.2.1 Coarse-Grained Taint Analysis
Coarse-grained taint analysis marks a program variable thats holds the incoming
data from an untrusted source as tainted. Figure 5 shows an SQL query. The entire
query string in the variable $cmd is marked as tainted, even if it derives only a portion
of its value from the variable name, which stores untrusted incoming data [2]. Hence,
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differentiating between a permissible query string, when the variable name contains
a valid string, from an attack, when it contains SQL commands (for e.g. DROP,
UPDATE, DELETE) and/or special characters is impossible.
$cmd = "SELECT pr i c e FROM products WHERE name = ‘ " . $name . " ’ "
Figure 5: SQL query
Coarse-grained taint analysis rejects the tainted query string in variable $cmd.
Thus, it successfully prevents a possible SQL injection attack; however, it also makes
it impossible for a legitimate query string to be executed.
Perl tracks taint at a coarser granularity — that of a variable [2] [7]. In Perl,
taint mode can be enabled by using the -T command line flag. In taint mode, Perl
taints every data that comes from outside the code. The data needs to be explicitly
untainted before it is used in a security sensitive context. The data is untainted after
validation checks are performed to ensure that it is safe to use. Ruby also tracks taint
at a coarser granularity. In Ruby, one can explicitly taint and untaint objects [6].
The objects need to be untainted before they are used in security-sensitive operations.
Detectors that implement coarse-grained taint analysis may result in more number
of false positives [5], as they lack the ability to differentiate between an actual attack
from a ‘‘good’’ data marked as tainted. Thus, they fail to provide detailed information
about the vulnerability.
2.3.2.2 Fine-Grained Taint Analysis
Tainting is marking incoming data from untrusted sources as ‘‘tainted.’’ While
coarse-grained taint analysis marks an entire string as tainted even if it derives only
a part of it’s value from tainted data, fine-grained taint analysis, marks individual
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characters in the string as tainted. Nguyen-Tuong et al. [12] has modified the
implementation of string datatype in a PHP interpreter such that it holds the taint
information for string values at the granularity level of a character in the string. The
taint information propagates across compositions, assignment operations, and function
calls at the granularity level of individual character. Hence, the name fine-grained or
precise-grained taint analysis.
Nguyen-Tuong et al. [12] also give a good example on fine-grained taint analysis.
Figure 6 shows a piece of code. In the code, the string in the variable $x derives one
part of its value from the user input and the other comes from a cookie. The values of
$_GET[‘name1’] and $_COOKIE[‘name2’] are marked as tainted as they come from
an untrusted source (let’s consider they are Jane and John). After concatenation, the
string in the variable $x and its taint markings (underlined) are: Hello Jane. I am
John. All characters in the two underlined strings are marked as tainted.
Chang et al.’s implementation [10] tracks taint at the granularity of a byte. This
enables fine-grained tracking of the data flow properties. This is essential because
tracking the taint at the granularity level of a variable is not safe in C, which is a
type-unsafe language.
$x = "He l lo " .$_GET[ ‘ name1 ’ ] . " . I am " .$_COOKIE[ ‘ name2 ’ ] ; $
Figure 6: PHP string
Fine-grained tainting helps to detect and prevent the most common web
application vulnerabilities like SQL & command injection attacks, cross-site scripting
attacks, etc. When a security-critical function uses tainted data in a dangerous way,
we can either reject the function call or sanitize the tainted data, endorse it (i.e. mark
it untainted), and then use it safely.
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2.4 Conclusion
Security vulnerabilities pose a great risk to the web application systems. It is
important to have a mechanism in place that helps in detection and prevention of
these vulnerabilities. Traditional access control policies fall inadequate in preventing
these attacks. Taint analysis marks incoming data from an untrusted source as tainted.
It tracks the introduction and flow of taint in the program. Static taint analysis
involves writing validation checks on the user input to make sure that the input is
safe. The programmer needs to code the validation checks, sanitize the input and
endorse it to mark it as safe to use. Dynamic taint analysis tracks taint while the
program is executing. Coarse-grained and fine-grained taint analysis are the two
flavors of dynamic taint analysis. Fine-grained tainting is an attractive option as it
tracks taint at the granularity level of individual characters in a string as apposed
to coarse-grained tainting that tracks taint at the string level. This precision allows
more sophisticated defenses against some of the attacks that we have discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation details
This section discusses two implementations of taint analysis in Rhino
1.7.8 — coarse-grained taint analysis & fine-grained taint analysis. Rhino is a
JavaScript engine written in Java. It is an open source software managed by the
Mozilla Foundation [13].
3.1 Coarse-grained taint analysis
Coarse-grained taint analysis tracks taint information at the granularity level of a
string. The idea is to mark incoming untrusted data as tainted. Taint information is
transferred from one variable to another variable through program execution. When
tainted data is used in a security critical operation, the program is crashed.
3.1.1 Functionalities
Three basic functionalities that coarse-grained taint analysis provide are -
1. taint
2. untaint
3. isTainted
taint marks an untrusted string read in from the outside environment as tainted.
isTainted provides a check to see whether a string is tainted or untainted. untaint
allows a tainted string to be marked as untainted. A tainted string should be marked
untainted only after it has been properly sanitized. This is called ‘‘endorsement.’’ An
endorsed variable is considered safe to be used in security-critical operations.
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The three functionalities have been realized in my Rhino implementation by
the taint, untaint, and isTainted methods respectively. All three methods are
implemented in the top-level scope. All three functions accept string variables or
string literals as a parameter. taint taints an input string and returns the tainted
string. untaint marks an input string untainted and returns the untainted string
which needs to be assigned to a variable. isTainted returns a boolean; it returns
true if the incoming string is tainted else it returns false.
Figure 7 shows how coarse-grained taint analysis taints and untaints a string
variable, and how to check whether a variable is tainted or untainted. In
Figure 7 taint(a) returns a tainted string ‘‘O’Reilly’’, and assigns it to variable
b. isTainted(b) returns true as the string b is referring to is marked as tainted.
b.replace(/’/g, "”") sanitizes the tainted string in variable b by replacing a single
quote with two single quotes, and untaint marks the sanitized string as untainted
and returns it, which is assigned to variable c. Hence, isTainted(c) returns false.
var a = "O’ Re i l l y " ;
var b = ta i n t ( a ) ;
i sTa inted (b) ; // r e tu rn s t rue
var c = unta int (b . r ep l a c e (/ ’ /g , " ’ ’ ") ) ; // c = "O’ ’ R e i l l y "
i sTa inted ( c ) ; // r e tu rn s f a l s e
Figure 7: String tainting
3.1.2 Taint Propagation
Taint analysis tracks the flow of an untrusted string throughout the program
execution. If a variable that contains a tainted string is used to initialize some other
variable, then the newly initialized variable is also marked as tainted. Figure 8 shows
an example of taint propagation through program execution.
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var a = " He l lo " ;
var b = ta i n t ( a ) ;
var c = b . bold ( ) . i t a l i c s ( ) . f o n t s i z e (6 ) . f o n t c o l o r ( " ye l low " ) ;
var d = c ;
var e = d . tr im ( ) ;
var f = e . r ep l a c e ( "He l lo " , "Hey" ) ;
var g = f + "Tejas " ;
var h = g . subs t r ( 0 , 3 ) ;
i sTa inted (h) ; // r e tu rn s t rue
Figure 8: Taint propagation
The string ‘‘Hello’’ is explicitly tainted using the taint function. Support has
been added to all the string functions (like bold, italics, trim, replace, concat, substr,
etc.) to handle taint propagation. So, if a function is called on a tainted string or a
tainted string is passed as a parameter to any of these functions, the resulting string
returned is also tainted.
3.1.3 Examples
This section discusses SQL injection attacks, and how coarse-grained taint analysis
helps in preventing web application systems from these attacks.
3.1.3.1 SQL Injection Attack
In Figure 9 user entered name is accepted and assigned to the variable name.
The name string is marked as tainted as it is an untrusted piece of data coming from
outside the code. The variable query contains a dynamically formed query that uses
the user entered id marked as tainted in the variable tainted_name.
In the case of coarse-grained taint analysis, the entire query string in the variable
query is marked as tainted as it derives a portion from the tainted data. Hence, it
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var name = document . getElementById ("name") . va lue ;
var tainted_name = ta i n t (name) ; // t a i n t s s t r i n g in id
query=" s e l e c t * from employee where ename =‘"+tainted_name
+" ’";
Figure 9: Query string
gets difficult to distinguish an attack from a legitimate query string. Thus, it makes it
all the more difficult to sanitize the query string and then execute it. Coarse-grained
taint analysis thus rejects the query string if its tainted, and throws an error and
crashes the system; if not the query is executed. Thus, this prevents the system from
a possible SQL injection attack, but at the cost of crashing on many valid queries.
Figure 10 shows how coarse-grained analysis may be used to handle the tainted query
string.
i f ( i sTa inted ( queryStr ) ) {
throw new Error ("Can ’ t execute a ta in t ed query ! " ) ;
}
e l s e {
exec_query ( queryStr ) ; // execute the query
}
Figure 10: Handling a tainted query
3.1.4 Limitations of coarse-grained taint analysis
Coarse-grained taint analysis tracks taint at the granularity level of a string. In
Figure 8, two string are concatenated and the resulting string is stored in the variable
g. The entire string in the variable g is marked as tainted as it derives a part of its
value from the variable f that contains tainted data.
Thus, coarse-grained tainting makes it difficult to sanitize a tainted string, as the
entire string is marked as tainted even if only a small portion of the string is derived
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from tainted data. Hence, in the case of coarse-grained taint analysis the best way to
prevent an attack is to suspend the execution, or crash the system whenever a tainted
string is passed to a security critical operation.
Coarse-grained taint analysis also results in high false positives, as it is hard to
sanitize the tainted string, even in the case of a legitimate user input. In contrast,
fine-grained taint analysis works at the granularity level of a character in a string. It
thus helps us keep track of the exact characters in the string are actually tainted.
3.2 Fine-grained taint analysis
Unlike coarse-grained taint analysis that tracks taint at the granularity level of
a string, fine/precise grained taint analysis tracks taint at the granularity level of a
character in a string. Hence, it gets easier to sanitize a tainted string and mark it as
untainted to indicate that it can be safely used in security-sensitive operations.
3.2.1 Functionalities
The fine grained taint analysis API extends the coarse-grained taint analysis API
with taintedRegions and sanitize functions.
In fine-grained taint analysis the function taint works a little differently than it
does in coarse-grained taint analysis. Fine-grained tainting taints individual characters
in a string, and keeps track of which characters are tainted. The untaint function
works exactly like it does in coarse-grained taint analysis. It is used to untaint a tainted
string after it is properly sanitized. This is called ‘‘endorsement.’’ An endorsed variable
is considered safe enough to be used in security-critical operations. The isTainted
function provides a check to see if either the entire string or region(s)/subset(s) of
the string are tainted. The taintedRegions function returns an array containing
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left & right boundaries of tainted region(s)/subset(s) in a string. One can iterate
over the tainted regions, sanitize them, and construct an untainted string that is safe
to use. If called on an untainted string, the function returns an empty array. The
sanitize function is introduced later, which allows string sanitization for different
attacks in an easier and a cleaner way, thus eliminating the need for duplicate code at
multiple places. It takes two arguments — a tainted string, and a callback function
to be applied on the untainted string to sanitize it. The function internally uses
the taintedRegions function to get all the tainted subsets in the string argument,
sanitizes them, and constructs a well-formed, sanitized, and safe-to-use string that is
untainted. It then returns the string. The callback function is specific to the attack
at hand, thus allowing the sanitize function to be used to prevent the system from
multiple possible attacks.
Figure 11 shows how fine-grained taint analysis taints and untaints a string. It
also shows how to check whether a string is tainted or not, and how to sanitize a
string that is marked as tainted.
var a = ta i n t ( "Hi" ) + " Jane " + ta i n t ( "Doe ! " )
i sTa inted ( a . sub s t r i ng (3 , 7 ) ) ; // r e tu rn s f a l s e
ta intedReg ions ( a ) ; // r e tu rn s [ [ 0 , 1 ] , [ 8 , 1 1 ] ]
// r e tu rn s a s a n i t i z e d s t r i n g
var b = s a n i t i z e ( a , f unc t i on ( s ) {return s . r ep l a c e (/ ’ /g , " ’ ’ ") ; } )
i sTa inted (b) ; // r e tu rn s f a l s e
Figure 11: String tainting
In Figure 11, variable a contains a string ‘‘Hi Jane Doe’’ with character ‘H’, ‘i’, ‘D’,
‘o’, ‘e’, and ‘!’ marked as tainted. isTainted(a.substring(3,7)) returns false as the
substring ‘‘Jane’’ does not contain tainted characters. taintedRegions(a) returns [[0,
1], [8, 11]], essentially an array of left & right boundaries of all the tainted regions in the
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string in variable a. sanitize(a,function(s){return s.replace(/’/g,"”");})
sanitizes all the taintedRegions in the string ‘‘Hi Jane Doe’’, and returns a reconstructed
well-formed sanitized untainted string back, which is assigned to variable b. Hence,
isTainted(b) returns false. The callback function is specific to the context the string
is going to be used in. The callback function that is passed as a parameter to the
sanitize function in the figure sanitizes the string for use in a SQL query.
3.2.2 Taint Propagation
Taint propagation in fine-grained taint analysis works similarly to how taint
propagates in coarse-grained taint analysis. Figure 12 shows an example of taint
propagation through program execution in fine-grained taint analysis.
var a = ta i n t ( " Hi" ) + " John " + ta i n t ( "Doe ! " ) ;
var b = a . t r imLe f t ( ) ;
var c = b ;
var d = c . tr imRight ( ) ;
var e = "He l lo ! " + d ;
var f = e . subs t r ( 0 , 6 ) ; // f = "He l lo ! "
i sTa inted ( f ) ; // r e tu rn s f a l s e
ta intedReg ions ( f ) ; // r e tu rn s an empty array
var g = e . subs t r (10 , e . l ength ) ; // g = "John Doe ! "
i sTa inted ( g ) ; // r e tu rn s t rue
ta intedReg ions ( g ) ; // r e tu rn s [ [ 5 , 8 ] ]
Figure 12: Taint propagation
The variable a contains a string ‘‘Hi John Doe!’’ with characters ‘H’, ‘i’, ‘D’, ‘o’,
‘e’, and ‘!’ explicitly marked as tainted. Taint support has been added to all the string
functions (like trimLeft, trimRight, replace, concat, substr, etc.). So, in the case of
either a function being called on a tainted string or a tainted string being passed as a
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parameter to a function, the characters in the resulting string are marked as tainted.
The variable f contains the string ‘‘Hello!’’, a substring of the tainted string in variable
e. However, none of the characters in the string ‘‘Hello!’’ are marked as tainted.
Hence, isTainted(f) returns false and taintedRegions(f) returns an empty array.
The variable g contains a substring ‘‘John Doe!’’ with characters ‘D’, ‘o’, ‘e’, and
‘!’ marked as tainted. Hence, isTainted(g) returns true and taintedRegions(g)
returns [[5,8]], an array containing the left and right boundary of the only tainted
region in the string.
3.2.3 Examples
This section discusses two attacks — SQL injection and cross-site scripting, and
how fine-grained taint analysis helps in preventing web application systems from these
attacks.
3.2.3.1 SQL Injection Attack
Let’s consider the same example as discussed in 3.1.3.1. In the case of fine-grained
taint analysis, only the characters in the query string in the variable query that come
from outside the code are marked as tainted. A user enters something like ‘‘O’Reilly’’
for name. With ‘‘O’Reilly’’ as the user entered name, the query string appears like:
select * from employee where ename = "O’Reilly";
with characters ‘O’, ‘’’, ‘R’, ‘e’, ‘i’, ‘l’, ‘l’, and ‘y’ marked as tainted. The
taintedRegions function is used to sanitize the tainted query. Figure 13 shows how
fine-grained analysis handles a tainted query. We iterate over the tainted regions in
the query string. The idxInQuery keeps tracks of the current index in the query.
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i f ( i sTa inted ( query ) ) {
l e t idxInQuery = 0 ;
l e t t a i n t e d r e g i on s = ta intedReg ions ( query ) ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < t a i n t ed r e g i o n s . l ength ; i++) {
l e t taintLBound = ta i n t ed r e g i on s [ i ] [ 0 ] ;
l e t taintRBound = ta i n t ed r e g i o n s [ i ] [ 1 ] ;
untaintedQuery += untaintQuery ( query , idxInQuery ,
taintLBound , taintRBound ) ;
idxInQuery = taintRBound + 1 ;
}
i f ( idxInQuery != queryLen )
untaintedQuery += query . sub s t r i ng ( idxInQuery , queryLen ) ;
exec_query ( untaintedQuery ) ; // execute the unta inted query
}
e l s e { exec_query ( query ) ; } // execute the query
func t i on untaintQuery ( ) {
i f ( taintLBound===0)
unta intedStr = "" ;
e l s e
unta intedStr = query . sub s t r i ng ( indexInQuery , taintLBound ) ;
ta intedSubStr = query . sub s t r i ng ( taintLBound , taintRBound+1) ;
sanitizedStr = taintedSubStr.replace(/’/g, "’’");
r e turn unta intedStr + s an i t i z e dS t r ;
}
Figure 13: Untainting a query string
The taintLBound & taintRBound correspond to the left and right boundaries of a
tainted region respectively. The untaintQuery function takes the query, idxInQuery,
taintLBound, and taintRBound as parameters. It sanitizes the tainted subquery
indexed from idxInQuery to taintLBound by replacing single quotes with two single
quotes, and returns the untainted substring. At the end of the for loop an untainted
query is constructed in the variable untaintedQuery, which looks like:
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select * from employee where ename = "O’’Reilly";
The untainted query string can be safely executed. Thus, fine-grained taint analysis
prevents the system from a possible SQL injection attack without having to crash the
program execution.
3.2.3.2 Cross-Site Scripting
Flanagan [14, Section 13.6.4] gives a fine example of a cross-site scripting attack.
Consider the web-page in Figure 14. It uses JavaScript to greet the user by name:
<s c r i p t >
var name = decodeURIComponent (window . l o c a t i o n . search .
sub s t r i ng (1 ) ) | | "" ;
document . wr i t e (" He l lo " + name) ;
</s c r i p t >
Figure 14: Sample web-page
window.location.search return the contents of the page URL after the question
mark. The dynamically generated content is then written to the document using
document.write(). The URL used to access the page looks like:
http://www.example.com/greet.html?John
The user is greeted as ‘‘Hello John’’. However, an attacker can inject a script after
the question mark which can lead to an unexpected behavior. For example, when the
URL is invoked with this (%3C is code for < & %3E is code for >):
http://www.example.com/greet.html?%3Cscript%3Ealert(‘!’)%3C/script%3E
It displays a dialogue box. This is a very simple example of cross-site scripting.
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In the case of fine-grained taint analysis, all the characters in the string in the
variable name are marked as tainted. The taintedRegions function is used to sanitize
the tainted string. Figure 15 shows how fine-grained analysis handles the tainted
string.
i f ( i sTa inted (name) ) {
l e t idx InSt r = 0 ;
l e t t a i n t e d r e g i on s = ta intedReg ions (name) ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < t a i n t ed r e g i o n s . l ength ; i++) {
l e t taintLBound = ta i n t ed r e g i on s [ i ] [ 0 ] ;
l e t taintRBound = ta i n t ed r e g i o n s [ i ] [ 1 ] ;
untaintedName += unta in tS t r i ng (name , idxInStr , taintLBound ,
taintRBound ) ;
idx InSt r = taintRBound + 1 ;
}
i f ( i dx InSt r != nameLen)
untaintedName += name . sub s t r i ng ( idxInStr , nameLen) ;
document . wr i t e (" He l lo " + untaintedName ) ;
}
e l s e { document . wr i t e (" He l lo " + name) ; }
func t i on unta in tS t r i ng ( ) {
i f ( taintLBound===0)
unta intedStr = "" ;
e l s e
unta intedStr = name . sub s t r i ng ( idxInStr , taintLBound ) ;
ta intedSubStr = name . sub s t r i ng ( taintLBound , taintRBound+1) ;
sanitizedStr =
taintedSubStr.replace(/</g,"&lt;").replace(/>/g,"&gt;");
r e turn unta intedStr + s an i t i z e dS t r ;
}
Figure 15: Untainting a user input string
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As one can see, the code to sanitize a string in the cross-site scripting attack is very
similar to the code to sanitize the query string in an SQL injection attack 3.2.3.1. The
major difference is the actual method of sanitization, highlighted in bold in figures 13
and 15. In case of SQL injection it is done as replace(/’/g, "”"), while in the case of
cross-site scripting it is done as replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;").
Hence, the better way would be to generalize the code, and write a single sanitize
function that can sanitize the strings in case of both types of attacks.
3.2.4 Sanitize Function
The sanitize function aims to reduce code duplication by generalizing the code
to sanitize the tainted strings. It takes 2 arguments — a tainted string, and a callback
function to sanitize the tainted string. Figure 16 shows the sanitize function.
func t i on s a n i t i z e ( s t r , c a l l b a ck ) {
l e t idx InSt r = 0 ;
l e t t a i n t e d r e g i on s = ta intedReg ions ( s t r ) ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < t a i n t ed r e g i o n s . l ength ; i++) {
l e t taintLBound = ta i n t ed r e g i on s [ i ] [ 0 ] ;
l e t taintRBound = ta i n t ed r e g i o n s [ i ] [ 1 ] ;
i f ( taintLBound===0) unta intedStr = "" ;
e l s e unta intedStr = s t r . s ub s t r i ng ( idxInStr , taintLBound ) ;
t a i n t edS t r = s t r . s ub s t r i ng ( taintLBound , taintRBound+1) ;
s a n i t i z e dS t r = ca l l b a ck . c a l l ( th i s , t a i n t edS t r ) ;
unta intedStr = unta intedStr + s an i t i z e dS t r ;
i dx InSt r = taintRBound + 1 ;
}
i f ( i dx InSt r != strLen ) unta intedStr+=s t r . sub s t r i ng ( idx InSt r ) ;
r e turn unta intedStr ;
}
Figure 16: Sanitize function
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Figure 17 shows how the sanitize function can be used to sanitize a tainted
query in the case of an SQL injection attack, and a tainted string in the case of
a cross-site scripting attack. In the case of an SQL injection attack, the callback
function replaces all the single quotes with two single quotes. The sanitize function
returns a sanitized and untainted query string, which is safe to use. The untainted
query string in the variable untaintedQuery could then be executed safely.
//Example − SQL i n j e c t i o n
i f ( i sTa inted ( query ) ) {
untaintedQuery = s a n i t i z e ( query , f unc t i on ( s ) { re turn s .
r ep l a c e (/ ’/ g , " ’ ’ " ) ; } ) ;
exec_query ( untaintedQuery ) ;
}
e l s e {
exec_query ( query ) ;
}
//Example − Cross−s i t e s c r i p t i n g
i f ( i sTa inted (name) ) {
sanit izedName = s a n i t i z e (name , func t i on ( s ) \{ re turn s .
r ep l a c e (/</g , "\& l t ; " ) . r ep l a c e (/>/g , "\&gt ; " ) ; \ } ) ;
document . wr i t e (" He l lo " + sanit izedName ) ;
}
e l s e {
document . wr i t e (" He l lo " + name) ;
}
Figure 17: Sanitize function call
In the case of a cross-site scripting attack, the callback function replaces the
angular brackets in the tainted string in the variable name with their corresponding
HTML entities. This helps to escape and deactivate any HTML tags in the tainted
string. The sanitized and untainted string in the variable sanitizedName could then
be used safely in document.write().
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CHAPTER 4
Performance Tests
In order to quantify the performance overhead caused because of coarse-grained
and fine-grained taint analysis, I modified the popular JavaScript performance
benchmark SunSpider [15]. The JavaScript files in the SunSpider benchmark test suite
were interpreted and executed on both the variants of Rhino — one with support added
for coarse-grained taint analysis and the other with support added for fine-grained
taint analysis. The results were compared against the baseline. These tests were
performed on a Mac Book Pro with one 2.7 GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 processor, 8
GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM, and an Intel Iris Graphics 6100 graphics processor with
1536 MB of memory.
The SunSpider benchmark test suite contains tests that are balanced between
different areas of the language and different types of code. It consists of tests on
String & RegExp manipulation, mathematical & bit operations, and other tests like
cryptography and code decompression. It runs each test multiple times and determines
an error range with a confidence interval of 95% [16]. Hence, claims to be statistically
sound.
I have commented out 5 tests from the test suite due to errors in code interpretation
on both my variants of Rhino. Two experiments were conducted as a part of the
performance tests. The first experiment was to run all the tests in the test suite
on all three variants of Rhino, with no variable explicitly marked as tainted. This
gave a comparison of the performance overhead caused by the implementation of
fine-grained taint analysis and coarse-grained taint analysis in my two variants of
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Rhino respectively against the unmodified version of Rhino. Table 1 shows the results
of the experiment. It compares the time taken in milliseconds for each test to run on
all three variants of Rhino. As observed from the table, in comparison to the Rhino
base version, the version with coarse-grained taint analysis adds an overhead of ≈ 4%,
while the fine-grained taint analysis version adds an overhead of ≈ 22%.
Table 1: Performance Test Results With No Tainted Variables
Test Rhino Base Rhino Coarse Rhino FineMean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
3d 551.6ms ±88.6% 573.7ms ±122.7% 573.1ms ±83.2%
cube 189.6ms ±114.8% 172.7ms ±76.9% 159.1ms ±92.3%
morph 211.9ms ±69.9% 240.4ms ±85.2% 245.3ms ±48.1%
raytrace 150.1ms ±82.8% 160.6ms ±231.6% 168.7ms ±140.6%
access 890.1ms ±41.1% 804.7ms ±67.0% 838.7ms ±48.5%
binary-trees 69.7ms ±64.3% 71.7ms ±142.5% 81.6ms ±74.6%
fannkuch 465.1ms ±23.5% 406.3ms ±52.6% 421.4ms ±40.9%
nbody 178.6ms ±40.6% 177.0ms ±82.1% 196.6ms ±65.2%
nsieve 176.7ms ±86.7% 149.7ms ±55.5% 139.1ms ±61.4%
bitops 904.9ms ±24.1% 1015.6ms ±12.7% 1061.9ms ±62.0%
3bit-bits-in-byte 152.9ms ±93.6% 154.1ms ±50.2% 145.9ms ±35.2%
bits-in-byte 263.6ms ±14.1% 234.4ms ±28.1% 241.3ms ±130.3%
bitwise-and 244.0ms ±9.7% 405.6ms ±2.5% 432.9ms ±78.9%
nsieve-bits 244.4ms ±10.0% 221.4ms ±4.6% 241.9ms ±46.2%
controlflow 93.3ms ±119.4% 84.4ms ±13.7% 101.1ms ±58.4%
recursive 93.3ms ±119.4% 84.4ms ±13.7% 101.1ms ±58.4%
crypto 266.3ms ±35.2% 267.9ms ±58.43% 766.7ms ±50.0%
md5 172.7ms ±35.8% 174.9ms ±80.6% 594.9ms ±50.7%
sha1 93.6ms ±34.1% 93.0ms ±17.3% 171.9ms ±49.8%
date 108.7ms ±124.0% 166.3ms ±109.8% 192.1ms ±106.3%
format-tofte 108.7ms ±124.0% 166.3ms ±109.8% 192.1ms ±106.3%
math 524.4ms ±12.9% 550.0ms ±35.4% 585.7ms ±49.7%
cordic 254.9ms ±16.8% 249.3ms ±37.7% 267.6ms ±41.9%
partial-sums 173.3ms ±8.1% 206.9ms ±33.8% 223.4ms ±46.6%
spectral-norm 96.3ms ±14.5% 93.9ms ±33.3% 94.7ms ±84.0%
string 249.6ms ±73.2% 263.7ms ±66.7% 264.7ms ±85.5%
fasta 145.0ms ±55.9% 196.0ms ±60.5% 198.9ms ±61.3%
unpack-code 104.6ms ±98.0% 67.7ms ±88.1% 65.9ms ±167.0%
total 3588.9ms ±44.7% 3726.3ms ±55.4% 4384.1ms ±56.0%
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In the second experiment in the crypto-md5 test was modified to introduce taint
in an incremental fashion. The first test kicked off with ten calls to the crypto-md5
test with no taint explicitly introduced. The subsequent tests are conducted with +1
tainted calls than the previous test, until all the ten calls are tainted. The Figure 18a
shows Test0 with no tainted calls, and Figure 18b shows Test1 with one tainted call
out of all the ten calls. Similarly, Test2 with two tainted calls, and so on until Test10
with all the calls tainted.
// Test 0
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
(a) Test 0
// Test 1
var md5Output = hex_md5(
t a i n t ( p la inText ) ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
var md5Output = hex_md5(
pla inText ) ;
(b) Test 1
Figure 18: Incremental taint introduction
The tests were run on my two implementations of Rhino to compare the
performance overhead caused on both variants when taint is introduced in the program.
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Table 2 shows the results of the second experiment.
Table 2: Taint Performance Test Results
Tainted variables Rhino Coarse Rhino FineMean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
0 933.2ms ±83.5% 2692.4ms ±81.6%
1 976.0ms ±69.7% 2756.0ms ±80.0%
2 966.8ms ±82.5% 2833.0ms ±44.0%
3 967.6ms ±107.0% 2890.2ms ±40.3%
4 872.0ms ±162.1% 2836.0ms ±79.7%
5 868.2ms ±164.8% 2630.2ms ±61.1%
6 925.6ms ±150.9% 2667.2ms ±56.7%
7 883.8ms ±133.7% 2662.8ms ±51.4%
8 953.8ms ±129.9% 2711.4ms ±53.4%
9 919.4ms ±109.5% 2626.4ms ±43.2%
10 895.0ms ±94.2% 2628.6ms ±50.1%
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As seen in Table 2, the execution time of the tests on both the versions of Rhino
go up & down, and does not increase in proportion with the increase in the number of
tainted calls. However, all the tests on fine-grained taint analysis version of Rhino
take ≈ 3𝑋 time to execute as compared to the coarse-grained taint analysis version.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion & Future Work
In the paper, I have provided an insight into how dynamic taint analysis could
be deployed to tackle prevalent attacks on web application systems. Most common
attacks on the web application systems like SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and
format string attacks are caused due to unchecked user input. The paper discusses
conventional techniques like static analysis, access control policies, and code reviews
and how they are inadequate to prevent these attacks.
Dynamic taint analysis provides a mechanism to track taint while the program is
in execution. The data coming from outside the code is not trustworthy. Hence, it is
marked as tainted, and tracked throughout the program execution. In this project, I
implemented dynamic taint analysis in Rhino, a JavaScript engine. JavaScript being
one of the most favored languages for web application is prone to the aforementioned
attacks. Hence, it is crucial to address these vulnerabilities.
I have shown two flavors of dynamic taint analysis namely coarse-grained and
fine/precise-grained taint analysis, implemented on two variants of Rhino respectively.
Coarse-grained taint analysis tracks taint information at the granularity level of a
string. Fine-grained taint analysis tracks taint at the granularity level of the characters
in the string. Fine-grained taint analysis provides more control in terms of being
able to sanitize a tainted string than coarse-grained taint analysis. Although both
the approaches are equally good at preventing the system from a possible attack,
fine-grained taint analysis edges out coarse-grained taint analysis in terms of number
of false positives, and its ability to help library writers sanitize strings.
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The paper showed that fine-grained taint analysis in general incurs more overhead
as compared to coarse-grained taint analysis, as expected. It causes an overhead of
≈ 22%, and coarse-grained taint analysis causes an overhead of ≈ 4% in comparison
to the Rhino base version, when no variable is tainted. The paper also made an
observation that fine-grained taint analysis is ≈ 3𝑋 slower than coarse-grained taint
analysis, when taint is introduced in the program in an incremental fashion.
With the ever increasing popularity of web applications, and the prevalent security
vulnerabilities that pose a threat to them, implementing language level features to
prevent these security vulnerabilities is essential. The paper shows that implementing
dynamic taint analysis as a language feature proves more effective in preventing
these attacks as compared to the conventional techniques. While coarse-grained
taint analysis stops the attack by crashing the system after an attack is detected,
fine-grained taint analysis provides more control in preventing the attack. It enables
a tainted string to be sanitized and used safely later on, thus preventing the system
from a possible attack without having to crash it. While the paper mainly talks about
preventing the web applications from SQL injection and cross-site scripting, both
fine-grained and coarse-grained dynamic taint analysis approaches could be easily
extended to Eval and other constructs in the language to prevent the systems from
eval injection and format string attacks. In the future, I would also like to dig deeper
into the code to identify optimizations that can be done to the code to improve the
performance.
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